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Note
Power Lines: Climate Change and the
Politics of Undergrounding
DEBORAH BRUNDY†
After years of enduring devastating loss of property and life, toxic air quality and intermittent
power shutoffs, the public is primed for dramatic change to ensure a safe and resilient power
grid. To achieve this, Californians are demanding that utilities bury the wires. As the court in
Town of Tiburon v. Bonander emphasized over a decade ago, “it requires no independent
research to support the self-evident conclusion that placing overhead utility wires underground
will reduce the risk of weather-related power outages as well as the safety risk posed by downed
utility poles and lines.”1 Wholesale undergrounding is not the cure-all to California’s megafires,
but the evidence demonstrates that a wholesale review and revision of California’s regulatory
system for permitting and implementing undergrounding is required. This Note brings together
the available research on undergrounding in the backdrop of climate change and its social,
environmental and economic impacts on California. The findings establish that a “holistic
evaluation of costs and benefits” substantiates the public’s desire for undergrounding.2 The
outsized benefit of lowering the risk and costs of megafires for the state and its citizens demands
that California take action to cause utilities to underground power lines wherever feasible.

† J.D. 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank U.C.
Hastings Research & Instruction Librarian Holly Herndon for her tireless research support, Professors Peter H.
Schuck, Dave Owen, and David Takacs for their invaluable insight and feedback, and the Hastings Law Journal
staff—particularly Andrew Klair, Samer Aref, Kendal Mitchell, Clare Moran, and Lauren Trambley.
Additionally, this Note would not have been possible without the support of James Brundy and the incredible
work of local, national, and international journalists covering California’s new abnormal.
1. 180 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1079 (2009).
2. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND
THE VALUE OF NOTHING 210 (2004). Ackerman and Heinzerling advocate for an extension to the conventional
cost-benefit analysis, proposing the incorporation of four principles for protection of public health and the
environment: “holistic, rather than atomistic, methods of evaluating costs and benefits[;] [l]earn from the
military: moral imperatives are more powerful than cost comparisons[;] [a]dopt a precautionary approach to
uncertain, potentially dangerous risks[; and,] [p]romote fairness—toward the poor and powerless today, and
toward future generations.” Id.
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THE NEW ABNORMAL

In the aftermath of the recent megafires that engulfed California, which
caused billions of dollars in damage and left devastating scars on communities
across the state, Californians are demanding that state officials address the
wildfire threat posed by overhead power lines.3 Ignitions from power lines and
other outdated electrical equipment are responsible for nearly half of the state’s
twenty most destructive fires.4 Between 2014 and 2017, equipment from
California’s three largest investor-owned utilities (IOU), which provide power
to the vast majority of the state, sparked over 2000 fires.5 Then in 2017 and 2018,
California endured six of the ten most destructive fires in state history.6
Undergrounding, the process of burying overhead power lines, would greatly
lower the risk of fire.7 Despite the promise of undergrounding, however, many
observers consider it exorbitantly expensive and, ultimately, cost prohibitive.8
This Note focuses on Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E), California’s
largest IOU and power provider, as its power lines span 70,000-square miles
covering Northern and Central California.9 For years, opponents of PG&E have
decried the company and argued that it should be customer-owned to ensure safe
and reliable service.10 While sound leadership and governance are critical to
providing safe service to millions of Californians, the more immediate issue is
PG&E’s failing power grid infrastructure. Whoever leads PG&E in the future
will bear the responsibility of hardening its vast network of distribution and
transmission lines—nearly all of which are past their useful life.11

3. See, e.g., A.B. 281, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2019); Letter from Staci Heaton, Senior Regulatory
Affairs Advocate, Rural Cty. Representatives of Cal., to Caroline Thomas Jacobs, Dir., Wildfire Safety Div. 4
(Apr. 6, 2020), ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.ggov/WMP/PublicComments/ (follow “Joint Local Govts Comments 2020
WMP.pdf” hyperlink).
4. Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires, CAL FIRE, http://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5511/top20
_destruction.pdf (last visited June 28, 2020).
5. Taryn Luna, California Utility Equipment Sparked More than 2,000 Fires in Over Three Years, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-utilities-wildfiresregulators-20190128-story.html.
6. Cal. Exec. Order N-05-19 (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.8.19EO-N-05-19.pdf.
7. David R. Baker, Underground Power Lines Don’t Start Wildfires. But They’re Really Expensive, S.F.
CHRON. (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Underground-power-lines-don-t-causewildfires-12295031.php?psid=3moHS.
8. Id.
9. Company Profile, PG&E, https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/company-information/profile/
profile.page (last visited June 28, 2020).
10. Rebecca Smith, San Jose to Propose Turning PG&E into Giant Customer-Owned Utility, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/san-jose-to-propose-turning-pg-e-into-giant-customer-owned-utility-11571685117
(last updated Oct. 21, 2019); see S.B. 917, 2019–2020 Leg. (Cal. 2020); Judy Lin, What Happens if California
Takes Over PG&E?, CALMATTERS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://calmatters.org/politics/2020/02/what-happens-ifcalifornia-takes-over-pge/ (“Gov. Gavin Newsom has threatened a public takeover of Pacific Gas & Electric
unless it can transform into a provider of affordable, reliable, clean and—above all—safe energy.”).
11. Anne C. Mulkern, Options to Cut Wildfire Risk Include State Takeover of PG&E, E&E NEWS:
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062188183 (“[I]f California took
over PG&E’s system entirely . . . it would be responsible for future wildfire costs associated with PG&E lines.
That could potentially affect the creditworthiness of the state.”).
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This dying infrastructure is at the center of the megafires ravaging Northern
California and needs to be rebuilt. California has an opportunity to build a power
grid resilient to climate change by migrating the lines underground wherever
possible. Yet, PG&E estimates the cost of migrating overhead distribution lines
underground at around $3 million per mile.12 With approximately 81,000 miles
of overhead distribution lines,13 this estimate would place the cost for
undergrounding PG&E’s entire distribution network at roughly $243 billion.14
Thus, conventional wisdom is that undergrounding is not a viable option to
minimize California’s fire risk because of the steep sticker price. Adding
credence to this assumption is that, while ratepayers may desire undergrounding,
their tolerance for rate hikes to cover the costs of undergrounding is minimal.15
The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), which represents all of the United States’
IOUs, released a report in 2012 that found that less than 10% of polled customers
would be amenable to their bills increasing twofold, which EEI states is
necessary to pay for the cost of undergrounding.16
Given this resistance to undergrounding, there is little academic
scholarship exploring the feasibility of undergrounding, particularly in
California.17 This Note aims to augment that scholarship by analyzing the
undergrounding of PG&E’s network in the context of California’s regulatory
framework and climate change’s impact on the state. In response to the Camp
Fire that destroyed Paradise, California, in 2018, then-Governor Jerry Brown
famously stated that “[t]his is not the new normal, this is the new abnormal. And
this new abnormal will continue, certainly in the next ten to fifteen to twenty
years. And unfortunately, the best science is telling us that dryness, warmth,
drought, all those things, they’re going to intensify.”18 Undergrounding is not
the panacea to California’s wildfire risks, but it can no longer be written off as
simply infeasible due to cost. Rather, the costs related to the new abnormal
California faces dictate that the narrative around undergrounding must change.
Treating undergrounding as an all-or-nothing solution, which makes
undergrounding cost-prohibitive, is no longer relevant given the dramatic
impacts of climate change on California’s environment. Indeed, the impacts of
the new abnormal demonstrate that selective undergrounding is necessary for
the creation of a resilient power grid.
12. Facts About Undergrounding Electric Lines, PG&E (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.pgecurrents.com/
2017/10/31/facts-about-undergrounding-electric-lines/.
13. Id.
14. The author approximated this estimate by multiplying PG&E’s $3 million per mile estimate by 81,000.
This estimate is meant as an illustration and should not be cited as the precise cost estimate for undergrounding
all of PG&E’s above ground distribution network.
15. KENNETH L. HALL, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND 2012: AN UPDATED STUDY
ON THE UNDERGROUNDING OF OVERHEAD POWER LINES, at v (2012), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/
electricreliability/undergrounding/Documents/UndergroundReport.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Peter H. Larsen, A Method to Estimate the Costs and Benefits of Undergrounding Electricity
Transmission and Distribution Lines, 60 ENERGY ECON. 47, 47 (2016).
18. Cal OES, Live: Emergency Officials Provide Wildfire Update at State Operations Center, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAVF-SWaPOQ&feature=emb_title.
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Therefore, the debate around undergrounding should focus on the
regulatory mechanisms necessary to ensure that selective undergrounding
projects in high fire risk zones are prioritized and that project management best
practices mitigate the cost and timelines of implementation. To facilitate this
debate, this Note examines multiple issues: (1) It looks at how California’s new
state of “abnormal” makes fires more destructive and appraises the attendant
costs; (2) it reviews the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC)
Electric Rule 20 (Rule 20) program, which currently governs ratepayer funded
undergrounding projects; (3) it attempts to determine the full costs of
undergrounding and examines PG&E’s history with undergrounding; (4) it
summarizes California’s legislative response to the megafires and PG&E’s
Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP); and (5) it analyzes the feasibility of PG&E’s
WMP achieving the state’s legislative aims.
The analysis reveals that ensuring safe, reliable service that limits the risk
of wildfire requires an overhaul of PG&E’s distribution line infrastructure. The
data demonstrate that the preventive measures currently proposed by PG&E are
woefully insufficient to provide the necessary resilience for withstanding the
new abnormal.19 Rather, the realities of executing those measures indicate that
undergrounding should be given a priority position in the mix of fire risk
reduction strategies—above both vegetation management and de-energization
measures—to ensure that the state’s largest power provider is able to deliver
energy effectively. The impacts of climate change on California’s landscape
now require that power grid infrastructure be moved underground, where
feasible, particularly in high fire-threat zones to ensure the long-term health and
safety of the state’s residents as well as their property. Furthermore, a resilient
power grid is necessary to facilitate California’s shift away from fossil fuels to
achieve the state’s ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40%
below 1990 levels by 2030.20
A. DRIVERS OF THE NEW ABNORMAL
1.

Climate Change

The new abnormal is a consequence of many factors, several of which stem
from climate change. In the past decade, California has experienced some of its
hottest years on record, resulting in a severe and protracted drought.21 The
19. See Out of Control: The Impact of Wildfires on our Power Sector and the Environment: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy & Subcomm. on Env’t & Climate Change of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
116th Cong. 1–2 (2020) (testimony of William D. Johnson, Chief Executive Officer and President, PG&E Corp.)
[hereinafter Hearing on Wildfires] (“[E]lectric transmission and distribution lines and related infrastructure are
vulnerable to extreme weather conditions, including winds over 70 miles per hour.”).
20. S.B. 32, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38566).
21. CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
CALIFORNIA: REPORT SUMMARY 4 (2018), https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/climate-change/report/
2018indicatorssummary.pdf (“The last four years were notably warm, with 2014 being the warmest on record,
followed by 2015, 2017, and 2016.”). Id. at 5 (“Five of the eight years of severe to extreme drought . . . occurred
between 2007 and 2016, with unprecedented dry years in 2014 and 2015. The record warmth from 2012 to 2016
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warmed, parched environment, a concomitant effect of the drought, enabled a
plague of bark beetles to attack weakened trees across the state,22 resulting in the
death of nearly 150 million trees since 2010.23 Examining the causes of the new
abnormal and increased scale of California’s wildfires, the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (“CAL FIRE”) found that: the fire
season is now more than two months longer than historical data show, and that
“reduced snowpack, and earlier spring snowmelt create longer and more intense
dry seasons that increase moisture stress on vegetation . . . .”24 The “unusually
warm temperatures intensif[y] the effects of very low precipitation and
snowpack and create[] conditions for extreme, high severity wildfires that spread
rapidly.”25 Moreover, the state’s “forests and woodlands are responding to
climate change” with an increase in growth of smaller trees and oak trees, which
provide fuel for wildfires.26
2.

Forest Management

While climate change is responsible for many of the conditions that fuel
wildfires, the state’s and federal government’s forest management practices
have intensified the scale of devastation. Research indicates that “[a] century of
aggressive fire suppression and decades of restricted timber harvesting have
resulted in an unnatural accumulation of fuels on many California forestlands.
Where 50–70 trees per acre stood before the Gold Rush, California forests now
average over 400 trees per acre.”27 Overgrown forests increase fire fuel supply
and prevent snowfall from being added to the snowpack, which is a critical
component of the state’s water supply system “and is expected to decline as a
result of rising temperatures.”28 In response to Governor Gavin Newsom’s
directive under Executive Order N-05-19 to recommend “administrative,
regulatory and policy changes . . . necessary to prevent and mitigate wildfires to
the greatest extent possible, with an emphasis on environmental sustainability
and protection of public health,”29 CAL FIRE reviewed its policies and found
that “California’s forest management efforts have not kept pace with these
growing [climate change-related] threats.”30 In fact, evaluation of California’s
coincided with consecutive dry years, including a year of record low snowpack, leading to the most extreme
drought since instrumental records began in 1895.”).
22. FOREST SERVS., USDA, BARK BEETLES IN CALIFORNIA CONIFERS: ARE YOUR TREES SUSCEPTIBLE? 1
(2015), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5384837.pdf.
23. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 1.
24. See CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PREVENTION & MITIGATION
REPORT: IN RESPONSE TO EXEC. ORDER N-05-19, at 4 (2019), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5584/45-dayreport-final.pdf.
25. CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Christopher Dicus, Fire on the Landscape: Current Policies and a Changing Climate Lead Toward
Higher Costs, More Severe Wildfire, 13 CAL. FORESTS 16, 16 (2009).
28. S.B. 901 § 1(c), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
29. Cal. Exec. Order N-05-19 (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.8.19EO-N-05-19.pdf.
30. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 4.
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forests indicates that fifteen million acres require care and that the current levels
of state, federal, and private forest management are “inadequate to improve the
health of millions of acres of forests and wildlands,”31 which is necessary to
mitigate the intensity and frequency of wildfires.
3.

Land Use Practices

Increased development within these vulnerable forests is another important
factor.32 Communities in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), defined by CAL
FIRE as “[t]he line, area, or zone where structures and other human development
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels,”33 face the
greatest risk. Building in this transition zone, areas naturally susceptible to
wildfires, greatly increases the risk of fire.34 Yet, between 1990 and 2010,
roughly a million homes were built in California WUIs.35 WUIs span a widerange of communities from Bay Area cities like Berkeley to rural communities
that dot the foothills of the Sierra Nevada to metropolitan areas between Los
Angeles and Orange counties.36 Additionally, exposure to fire has not deterred
residents from rebuilding in WUIs.37 From 1970 to 2009, “49 percent of burned
buildings [in California] were rebuilt within six years,” according to United
States Forest Service researcher Miranda H. Mockrin.38 Although homes built
after 1991 must meet the nation’s strictest fire regulations, the average California
home dates from the 1950s.39 Therefore, a significant portion of the population
lives in homes vulnerable to fire risk.
Paradise, California, is representative of a WUI community that endured
the horrific effects of wildfire-related devastation. Founded in the late 1800s, the
town is nestled in the forests of the Sierra Nevada foothills.40 The town’s
population of nearly 27,000 was composed of retirees and those looking for a
more affordable alternative to California’s expensive coastal cities and towns.41
In recent years, like many other California towns, Paradise developed further
and further into overgrown forested areas with little fire planning or zoning

31. Id.
32. Kendra Pierre-Louis & Jeremy White, Americans Are Moving Closer to Nature, and to Fire Danger,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/climate/california-fires-wildland-urbaninterface.html.
33. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 20.
34. Pierre-Louise & White, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kirk Siegler, “Reimaging Paradise”—Making Plans to Rebuild a Town Destroyed by Wildfire, NPR
(Mar. 7, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/700825538/re-imagining-paradise-making-plans-torebuild-a-town-destroyed-by-wildfire.
41. Id.; Dale Kasler & Ryan Lillis, Paradise Will “Rise from the Ashes” After Camp Fire. Is That a Good
Idea?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 16, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/
article222900130.html.
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forethought.42 In 2013, Butte County, where Paradise is situated, estimated that
99% of “Paradise residents lived in areas facing a very high risk of wildfire.”43
In fact, the community weathered twelve fires in nearly twenty-years before the
Camp Fire destroyed 90% of Paradise, tragically claiming eighty-five lives and
razing close to 19,000 structures.44
In calling for reducing fire risk, former CAL FIRE Director and thirty-year
veteran of the force, Ken Pimlott stressed that “[w]e have hundreds of
communities like Paradise all over the state” and “[against] a fire that’s burning
like a blowtorch . . . our way of fighting fire isn’t going to work.”45 Indeed,
Paradise is one of 1329 WUI communities designated as high fire risk in
California.46 Mr. Pimlott recommended officials consider prohibiting
development in these fire prone areas; because, even though California “has the
nation’s most robust building requirement programs for new homes in fire-prone
areas,” they have not been sufficient to stave off wildfire risk as megafires have
only grown in size and frequency.47 Rather than prohibiting development in
WUIs as a fire reduction measure, the state should consider requiring
undergrounding of power lines, wherever feasible, in these communities to
remove a frequent source of wildfire ignition.
B. THE NEW ABNORMAL’S COST
The overall cost of the new abnormal justifies the expense of
undergrounding. As the atmosphere continues to warm towards 1.5 degrees
Celsius (“1.5C”) (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-1990 levels, the country
and world will increasingly experience more dangerous natural disasters.48 The
U.S. Global Change Research Program reports that “[m]ore frequent and intense
extreme weather and climate-related events, as well as changes in average
climate conditions, are expected to continue to damage infrastructure,
ecosystems, and social systems that provide essential benefits to
communities.”49 In the past few years, communities in the United States have
experienced natural disasters on a scale not previously seen, such as massive

42.
43.
44.
45.

Siegler, supra note 40.
Kasler & Lillis, supra note 41.
Siegler, supra note 40.
Steve Schoonover, Feds Make Push for More Forest Management After Camp Fire, CHICO
ENTERPRISE-RECORD, https://www.chicoer.com/2018/11/26/feds-make-push-for-more-forest-management/ (last
updated Nov. 26, 2018).
46. Communities at Risk List, CAL FIRE, https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/divisions/wildfire-planningengineering/fire-plan/communities-at-risk / (last visited June 28, 2020).
47. Don Thompson, Official: California Must Mull Home Ban in Fire-Prone Areas, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec.
11, 2018, 2:52 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-california-fires-home-ban-20181
211-story.html.
48. U.N. Env’t Programme & World Meteorological Org., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC], IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers 9 (Valérie MassonDelmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/10/SR15_SPM_version_stand_
alone_LR.pdf.
49. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY
FINDINGS 25 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch01_Summary-Findings.pdf.
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mudslides, vast flooding, ruinous hurricanes, and deadly wildfires.50 The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports that in 2019 alone,
fourteen climate-related catastrophes led to losses exceeding $1 billion each
across the United States “with a total cost of $45.0 billion.”51 Moreover, 2017
was the “costliest year on record for natural disasters in the United States, with
a price tag of at least $306 billion.”52
1.

The New Abnormal’s Impact on California’s Economy and Public
Welfare

Calculating the full costs of California’s wildfires requires extending the
costs reflected in the conventional cost benefit analysis to include the broader
impacts on society. Insurers have already paid out over $24 billion in losses
related to the 2017 and 2018 fires in California,53 and damage from the 2019
fires is estimated at $25.4 billion.54 Yet, these totals likely significantly
underestimate the full scale of economic losses from the wildfires.55 For
instance, more and more private insurers are refusing to issue policies for
wildfire prone areas, which exacerbates the state’s housing crisis by adding
expensive government and wrap-around insurance costs to already steep housing
prices.56 Additionally, unreliable power threatens California’s economy as
technology companies that require massive amounts of power for their
operations may move to other states, taking with them their share of the state’s
revenues from the innovation economy.57 The fires and unreliable power also
pose severe threats to tourism as well as California’s wine industry and its “$57.6
50. Umair Irfan & Brian Resnick, Megadisasters Devastated America in 2017. And They’re Only Going to
Get Worse, VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/28/16795490/natural-disasters-2017hurricanes-wildfires-heat-climate-change-cost-deaths (last updated Mar. 26, 2018); Tens of Millions Face
Flooding Threat Across Midwest, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018, 7:56 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
flooding-threat-midwest-today-2018-09-03/.
51. NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., NAT’L OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters: Time Series, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/time-series (last visited June 28, 2020).
52. Irfan & Resnick, supra note 50.
53. Nicole Friedman, High Cost of Wildfire Insurance Hurts California Home Sales, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5,
2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-cost-of-wildfire-insurance-hurts-california-home-sales11578220200.
54. Nic Querolo & Brian K. Sullivan, California Fire Damage Estimated at $25.4 Billion, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-28/california-fire-damages-already-at-25-4-billion-andcounting (last updated Oct. 29, 2019).
55. For a detailed account, see Figure 6 captioned “The Protection Gap Has Widened Over Time.” Storms,
Wildfires and Floods: How Climate Change Amplifies Insurance Risk, SWISS RE GROUP (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.swissre.com/risk-knowledge/mitigating-climate-risk/how-climate-change-amplifies-insurancerisk.html.
56. Id. While the State placed a moratorium on insurers dropping homes in high-risk fire zones, the
moratorium only applies to existing policies and does not ease the barrier to entry for new home purchases.
Nicole Friedman, California Bans Insurers from Dropping Homes in Wildfire Areas, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-bans-insurers-from-dropping-homes-in-wildfire-areas-11575585626?
mod=article_inline (last updated Dec. 5, 2019).
57. J.D. Morris, PG&E Electricity Rates Could Double After More Wildfires, Report Says, S.F. CHRON.,
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-electricity-rates-could-surge-50-13757757.php
(last updated Apr. 11, 2019).
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billion state economic impact.”58 Furthermore, the megafires pose great health
risks, not only to those in the line of fire but also to those in the surrounding
region who are susceptible to respiratory illness as a result of impacted air
quality,59 potentially stressing California’s public health system and causing
unnecessary loss of life. It is estimated that nearly 340,000 people worldwide
die annually from wildfire smoke.60 Forebodingly, the U.S. Forest Service
estimates that “[b]y 2050 . . . wildfires will be twice as destructive as they are
today; in some places, the area burned could grow fivefold,”61 indicating that
wildfire costs borne by society will only increase.
In addition to the health, insurance, and economic costs associated with
megafires, California is also managing the implications of PG&E’s bankruptcy
filing.62 In January 2019, PG&E filed a defensive bankruptcy to limit its
“estimated $30 billion or more in liabilities” stemming from recent megafires.63
In response to the filing, Governor Newsom issued a statement declaring that
PG&E’s choice to seek reorganization in bankruptcy court did not alter his
commitment to ensuring “that Californians have access to safe, reliable and
affordable service, that victims and employees are treated fairly, and that
California continues to make forward progress on our climate change goals.”64
However, achieving these goals may prove impossible without rebuilding
PG&E’s infrastructure to withstand the new abnormal.
2.

The New Abnormal’s Impact on Climate Change Policy

In a letter to Ana Matosantos, Governor Newsom’s Cabinet Secretary,
Steven Weissman, a lecturer at U.C. Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public
Policy, stressed that electric rates could “skyrocket . . . by 50%” as a result of
58. Media & Trade, CAL. WINE INST., https://discovercaliforniawines.com/media-trade/statistics/ (last
visited June 28, 2020); see also Vivian Ho, After the Wildfires: Tourist Firms in California’s Wine Country Say
No One Is Coming, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/08/
guerneville-wine-country-climate-crisis-business; Ester Mobley, Wildfires and Wine Country: How the Industry
Is Adapting to New Realities, S.F. CHRON., www.sfchronicle.com/wine/article/Wildfires-and-Wine-CountryHow-the-Industry-is-14563760.php (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
59. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 27.
60. David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (July 10, 2017),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html.
61. Id.
62. See PG&E Bankruptcy, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/pgechapter11 (last visited
June 28, 2020); PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, U.S. BANKR. CT., N.D. CAL.,
http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/case-info/pge-corporation-and-pacific-gas-and-electric-company (last visited
June 28, 2020).
63. G. Marcus Cole, Stanford Law’s Marcus Cole on PG&E Bankruptcy: No Free Lunches, STAN. L. SCH.
BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://law.stanford.edu/2019/03/01/stanford-laws-marcus-cole-onthe-pge-bankruptcy/; Peter Eavis & Ivan Penn, Can PG&E Survive the California Wildfires?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy.html. As part of
its bankruptcy proceeding, PG&E reached a $13.5 billion settlement with fire victims and plead guilty to
involuntary manslaughter charges arising from the Camp Fire. Ivan Penn & Peter Eavis, PG&E Will Plead Guilty
to Involuntary Manslaughter in Camp Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/
business/energy-environment/pge-camp-fire-manslaughter.html.
64. Press Release, Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, Governor Newsom Statement on PG&E
Bankruptcy Filing (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/01/29/pge-bankruptcy-filing/.
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the liabilities accrued from the 2017 and 2018 wildfires.65 Mr. Weissman warned
that such a dramatic increase in cost to the consumer would make accomplishing
the state’s 2030 emissions reductions goals impossible because increasing the
cost of electricity may lead customers to not use electric cars or convert to
electric appliances and heating, which are critical components of the state’s
climate change policies.66 In an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, Mr.
Weissman underscored that “if the expectation is that, on an ongoing basis,
ratepayers are going to be covering the costs of these wildfires if they’re
triggered by utilities, that is going to make it far more challenging to try to
accomplish a significant conversion from using fossil fuels to using
electricity.”67
Adding to California’s challenges for meeting its greenhouse gas reduction
goals are the smoke emissions from megafires, which contribute a shocking
amount of black carbon, a short-lived climate pollutant, to the atmosphere.68 For
example, CAL FIRE found that “[t]he 2013 Rim Fire, which burned 257,000
acres [near Yosemite], generated roughly 15 million metric tons of greenhouse
gas emissions, as much pollution as 2.3 million vehicles generate in a given
year.”69 It is estimated that emissions from a single year of statewide wildfires,
roughly twenty-five million tons, can negate the transportation fuel carbon
reduction gains of the next decade.70 Furthermore, wildfires that destroy forests
damage a critical carbon sink supporting the state’s climate change response.71
The legislature found that unless meaningful change is made to the status quo to
“reduce[] the risk and intensity of wildfires,” achievement of the state’s
greenhouse gas emission reduction programs will be impossible.72 Taking into
account the full costs of wildfires shows that, given the imperative to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and the ongoing impact wildfires have on public
health, well-being and the economy, it is time to change the way the state
approaches fire management. The steep upfront cost of undergrounding should
not be permitted to stand in the way of the significant long-term benefits and
savings achievable by avoiding the exorbitant costs incurred from wildfires year
after year.

65. Memorandum from Steven Weissman, Lecturer, U.C. Berkeley’s Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, to Ana
Matosantos, Cabinet Sec’y for Governor Gavin Newsom, The Massive Costs of the “New Normal” in Wildfires
& Climate Change Era (Apr. 10, 2019), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/news/news-center/the-massive-cost-of-thenew-normal-in-wildfires-climate-change-era.
66. Id.; see also S.B. 350, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2015); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 74 (2017), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf.
67. Morris, supra note 57.
68. See S.B. 901 § 1(e), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
69. Id. § 1(f).
70. Id.
71. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE AGENCY GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION REPORT CARD tbl.3-1
(2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/2018_CalEPA_Report_Card.pdf.
72. S.B. 901 § 1(f).
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C. AUSTRALIA’S WILDFIRES: A PORTENT FOR CALIFORNIA
California has yet to determine the final costs of the megafires, but the
California Department of Insurance announced that the 2018 wildfires “were the
world’s most expensive natural disasters, with more than $12 billion in total
insured losses reported to date.”73 This determination was made prior to the
2019–2020 Australian wildfires, the immense scale of which is a forceful
warning for California.74 Where the 2018 California fires burned 1.7 million
acres, the Australian bush fires burned roughly 30 million acres.75 Professor Rob
Jackson of Stanford University predicts that “emissions from this fire season
will be close to a billion tons of carbon dioxide by the time the bush fires are
finally extinguished,”76 which is twice the amount of Australia’s annual
emissions from all other sources.77 The Met Office, the United Kingdom’s
national meteorological service, expects that “[e]missions from the Australian
bushfires will make up one-fifth” of the world’s annual increase in carbon
emissions, pushing the “world closer to 1.5C of global heating.”78 Horrifically,
Professor Chris Dickman, an ecologist at the University of Sydney’s Faculty of
Science, estimates that the fires have killed more than one billion animals.79
Finally, the impact of the haze caused by the wildfires on Sydney’s economy is
calculated to be between $12 million and $50 million in Australian dollars per
day.80 Without significant action to reduce California’s wildfire risk, the state
may be vulnerable to fire of the magnitude suffered by Australia. If the state
were to endure a burn of 30 million acres, the losses would be staggering and
may easily rival the $243 billion estimate for undergrounding PG&E’s entire
distribution network.

73. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., Insurance Commissioners Visit Site of California’s Most Destructive
Wildfire During Risk and Resilience Summit (May 2, 2019), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100press-releases/2019/release036-19.cfm.
74. Ed Johnson, Australia’s Wildfire Crisis: Key Numbers Behind the Disaster, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-02/australia-s-wildfire-crisis-key-numbers-behind-thedisaster (last updated Jan. 15, 2020); Amy Corderoy & Lisa Cox, Counting the Cost of Australia’s Summer of
Dread, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2020/feb/11/
counting-the-cost-of-australias-summer-of-dread.
75. Johnson, supra note 74.
76. Andrew Freedman, Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Effectively Double as a Result of
Unprecedented Bush Fires, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/01/
24/australia-bush-fires-have-nearly-doubled-countrys-annual-greenhouse-gas-emissions/.
77. Denise Chow, Australia Wildfires Unleash Millions of Tons of Carbon Dioxide, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22,
2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/australia-wildfires-unleash-millions-tonscarbon-dioxide-n1120186.
78. Fiona Harvey, Australian Bushfires Will Cause Jump in CO2 in Atmosphere, Say Scientists, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 23, 2020, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/24/australian-bushfires-willcause-jump-in-co2-in-atmosphere-say-scientists.
79. More than One Billion Animals Killed in Australian Bushfires, UNIV. SYDNEY (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2020/01/08/australian-bushfires-more-than-one-billion-animalsimpacted.html#.XhWtKc7PatE.whatsapp.
80. Tim McDonald, Australia Fires: The Huge Economic Cost of Australia’s Bushfires, BBC (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50862349.
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II. UNDERGROUNDING: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
A. THE INHERENT RISK OF OVERHEAD POWER LINES
Electrical systems are a complex network of transmission, distribution, and
service lines.81 Power is provided through transmission lines, which transmit
electricity from a power generation facility to sub-stations.82 Distribution lines
then carry the electricity from sub-stations to a transformer.83 Service lines then
transfer that electricity to the consumer by transmission of power from the
transformer to the customer’s weather-head, the entry point for service to a
building.84 While providing a necessary service, this technology is vulnerable to
fire and a common source of ignition for major fires.85 A 2016 report on the
causes of wildland fires, by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group,86 found
that sources of power line fire ignition include: high winds; equipment failure;
contact with vegetation, either as a result of inadequate clearances for standing
vegetation or other vegetation on the ground;87 contact with animals and litter;
and poor equipment maintenance and cleaning.88 Furthermore, distribution
networks are a more likely cause of fire than transmission lines, because
distribution networks are closer to vegetation.89
The circumstances surrounding an ignition depend on its source. For
example, fires stemming from conductor failure occur when power poles,
linking lines together, break and fall to the ground allowing the lines to arc.90 In
other instances, although regulations require utilities to account for line sag in
high temperatures and wind conditions, these circumstances cause numerous fire
ignitions.91 Additionally, a fire may ignite due to the re-energizing of a line after
a manual or automatic re-closure of the line or due to an arc caused by contact
with birds.92 Further risk is posed by insulators, the large coils attached to
conductors, which can erupt in fire due to failures from a variety of factors
ranging from dirt and bird manure to high humidity and lightning strikes.93
81. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., GUIDE TO WILDLAND FIRE ORIGIN AND CAUSE
DETERMINATION 245 (2016), https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pms412.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 246.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Members of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group include: Bureau of Indian Affairs (U.S.
Department of the Interior), Bureau of Land Management (U.S. Department of the Interior), Fish and Wildlife
Service (U.S. Department of the Interior), Forest Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture), International
Association of Fire Chiefs, Intertribal Timber Council, National Association of State Foresters, National Park
Service (U.S. Department of the Interior), United States Fire Administration (Federal Emergency Management
Agency). The National Wildfire Coordinating Group, NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., https://www.
nwcg.gov/ (last visited June 28, 2020).
87. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., supra note 81.
88. Id. at 246.
89. Id. at 245–46.
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 251–52.
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A review of 414 incidents, reported from 2015 to 2017 in PG&E’s high
fire-threat districts,94 found power line and equipment failure accounted for the
vast majority of ignitions.95 Dry vegetation and the failure of conductors and
connectors, or hardware and other equipment failures accounted for 49% and
28% of ignitions, respectively.96 In contrast, third-party contact constituted 13%
of ignitions and animals caused 8% of ignitions.97 Finally, unknown ignitions,
defined by PG&E as, “situations where PG&E was unable to determine the
cause of ignition,” but “it appeared that the ignition may have been attributable
to PG&E facilities” represented 3% of ignitions.98
The high risk of fire due to power line and equipment failure underscores
the imperative for utilities to vigilantly monitor their distribution, transmission,
and service line systems. Yet, in investigating the causes of the Camp Fire, the
CPUC found that PG&E systematically failed to adequately inspect its lines.99
The company regularly deferred maintenance on its oldest lines and failed to
climb towers to inspect equipment not visible from the ground.100 Confirming
this failure, PG&E’s Chief Executive Officer, William Johnson, acknowledged
in recent testimony to the House of Representatives’ sub-committees on Energy
and Environment and Climate Change that in 2019 PG&E undertook “an
unprecedented process to inspect every element of our electric system within
the high fire-threat areas.”101
While the company has now reviewed “almost 750,000 transmission,
distribution and substation structures and over 25 million electrical components
in those areas”102 much of its grid remains past its useful life. PG&E estimates
that “the average age of its towers [i]s 68 years, but the mean life expectancy
[i]s only 65 years.”103 The Caribou-Palermo transmission line, which sparked
the Camp Fire, has been operating since 1921.104 When the company requested
to replace the Caribou-Palermo line’s wires, it declined to update the line’s
towers, indicating that PG&E may adhere to the notion of running equipment to

94. See FireMap, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://ia.cpuc.ca.gov/firemap/ (last visited June 28, 2020).
95. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN 26–27
(2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M263/K673/263673423.PDF.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 26.
99. Russel Gold & Katherine Blunt, PG&E Had Systemic Problems with Power Line Maintenance,
California Probe Finds, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-had-systemic-problems-with-powerline-maintenance-california-probe-finds-11575338873 (last updated Dec. 3, 2019, 12:27 PM); see also PAC.
GAS & ELEC. CO. ET AL., JOINT MOTION OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (U 39 E), THE SAFETY AND
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, COALITION OF CALIFORNIA
UTILITY EMPLOYEES, AND THE OFFICE OF THE SAFETY ADVOCATE FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
(2019), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/I.1906-015_Joint%20Motion%20for%20Approval%20of%20Settlement%20Agmt_12-17-19PDFA.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Gold & Blunt, supra note 99.
104. Id.
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failure before replacing it.105 Adding to the danger posed by outdated equipment
is the fact that much of PG&E’s service area is situated among roughly 100
million trees “with the potential to grow into or fall into the lines.”106 Thus, the
risk of overhead power line ignition combined with the force-multipliers of
climate change, dead and at-risk vegetation, and development in the WUI,
emphasize that current fire prevention systems for overhead power lines are not
sufficient.107
B. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF UNDERGROUNDING
Undergrounding is not a silver bullet for wildfires; but the days of blindly
accepting that it is cost prohibitive, and therefore a non-starter, are over. The
new abnormal requires a holistic approach to cost-benefit analysis rather than an
“atomistic and reductionist approach adopted in the dominant style of CostBenefit Analysis.”108 This is because the holistic approach responds to the
“nature of the risks involved, the questions of fairness and distribution of
burdens, and the importance of providing for the future, [which] all affect the
policies that should be adopted to protect health and the environment.”109 Not
all of the system can or should be migrated underground, but there are high-risk
areas where investment in undergrounding of distribution lines would save the
state massive losses of life, health, and property.110
The benefits of undergrounding outweigh the costs. Noted benefits include:
(1) robustness to most weather events, (2) less exposure to wildlife and trees, (3)
increased reliability during high winds and storms, (4) easier obtainment of an
easement, and (5) better public safety.111 Significantly, undergrounding removes
the entire cost of vegetation management.112 However, key costs of
undergrounding include: (1) the expense of installation, (2) higher replacement
costs, (3) increased material costs and longer installation timeframes, (4)
increased repair times, and (5) susceptibility of the system to damage from those
digging improperly.113 While the costs associated with undergrounding are
mostly related to labor, and therefore can be held to a minimum through skillful
project management, utilities cannot replicate the benefits associated with
undergrounding any other way. Utilities should take the opportunity to move
towards undergrounding as their primary means to remove most of the ignition

105. Ivan Penn et al., How PG&E Ignored Fire Risks in Favor of Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html.
106. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 19.
107. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 4.
108. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 211.
109. Id. at 212–13.
110. See J.D. Morris, Put PG&E’s Power Lines Underground? It Can Be Done—Expensively and Slowly,
S.F. CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/Put-PG-E-s-power-lines-underground-Itcan-be-14565060.php (last updated Oct. 27, 2019). Undergrounding is not appropriate in areas susceptible to
earthquake or flooding. Id.
111. HALL, supra note 15, at 25.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id.
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risks associated with overhead distribution lines and maximize the resilience of
their networks.
To facilitate an increase in the use of undergrounding, Governor Newsom
should convene a commission of experts tasked specifically with developing a
regulatory framework for carrying out undergrounding projects efficiently and
expeditiously. Nearly 85% of the cost of undergrounding is related to digging
trenches and repairing infrastructure damaged by that digging,114 and the
average timeline for an undergrounding project is five to seven years.115
However, streamlined permitting processes and best practices for project
implementation could greatly mitigate costs. To expedite projects, third-party
contractors could be utilized instead of relying entirely on utility employees. As
California counties argue, “[i]f local governments are able to perform the work
themselves, or if a private company can be selected through a competitive
solicitation, local governments will not be dependent on the IOUs’ schedule and
constraints.”116 Undergrounding PG&E’s network offers the state a major jobs
creation opportunity that can be used to revitalize local economies by supporting
third-party businesses and local municipalities.117 Furthermore, an increased
focus on undergrounding over vegetation management would allow the Forest
Management Task Force to take the lead on implementing programs that
maximize forest health and carbon sequestration in line with the state’s climate
change policies.
Addressing the barriers to undergrounding requires a commission of
experts who can reconcile: the nuances of the state’s wide ranging climate
change laws and the Rule 20 program; permitting requirements of the California
Environmental Quality Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered
Species Act, and other statutory restrictions; PG&E’s complex network of
easements; the labor shortage for qualified line workers; and creative financing
options. It also requires experts in supply chain and project management, who
can unwind the various material, design, and labor costs associated with
“trenching, conduit, substructures, cabling and connections, meter panel
modifications, cutover work, and . . . removal from service of poles and wires,”
which the CPUC states “represent all costs associated with the undergrounding
114. David R. Baker, Wine Country Fires: PG&E Often Diverts Money for Undergrounding Power Lines,
S.F. CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Wine-Country-fires-PG-E-often-diverts-money-for12742239.php (last updated Mar. 13, 2018).
115. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, AUDIT OF PG&E RULE 20A UNDERGROUNDING PROGRAM 34 (2019),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=4403 (follow “PG&E’s Rule 20A program” hyperlink).
116. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, Comments on the Scoping Memo of the Order Instituting
Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Electric Rule 20 and Related Matters 7 (Jan. 11, 2019),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M258/K310/258310682.PDF.
117. The COVID-19 outbreak in the United States erupted while this Note was already in the publication
process. The United States, including the state of California, is experiencing unprecedented unemployment rates.
As of May 2020, California has received 4.5 million unemployment claims with Governor Gavin Newsom
predicting that “[u]nemployment numbers . . . will be north of 20 percent.” George Avalos, Coronavirus
Unemployment: One-Fourth of California Workers Could Lose Jobs, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercury
news.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-unemployment-layoff-job-california-great-depression-newsom-tech-retailrestaurant-hotel-construction/ (last updated May 12, 2020).
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effort.”118 Doing so requires state intervention as the local municipalities, CPUC
and PG&E are overburdened with other pressing matters, including those arising
from wildfires; and the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) and Wildfire Safety
Advisory Board (WSAB), tasked with overseeing implementation of WMPs,119
are not suited to reconcile the specific issues constraining undergrounding.
C. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR IOU UNDERGROUNDING
The Rule 20 program governs IOU undergrounding projects. Developed in
1967, the program allows municipalities and utilities to designate projects for
undergrounding, and it provides compensation to utilities for executing the
project through credits that are approved as part of the utility’s general rate
case.120 Approval of a Rule 20A project, the provision of Tariff Rule 20
governing municipal projects, requires that the project be in the public
interest.121 A public interest project is currently defined as one that:
“[e]liminate[s] an unusually heavy concentration of overhead lines; [i]nvolve[s]
a street or road with a high volume of public traffic; [b]enefit[s] a civic or public
recreation area or area of unusual scenic interest; [or is listed] as an arterial
street.”122 Under Rule 20A’s structure, municipalities are the drivers for
undergrounding projects. That is, municipalities must identify projects, hold
public hearings, consult with the utility to determine if a project qualifies for
utility ratepayer funds, and designate Underground Utility Districts (UDD) by
resolution.123 Rule 20A projects are often a result of organized neighborhood
groups interested in undergrounding for aesthetic and property value reasons.124
Notably, while Rule 20A’s criteria are limited and do not include wildfire
mitigation, the CPUC specially approved San Diego Gas and Electric’s
(SDG&E) consideration of wildfire risk as a criterion.125 In 2014, the CPUC
issued Rule 20D—a SDG&E-specific rule governing undergrounding in areas
SDG&E identifies as high fire risk and determines that undergrounding would
reduce wildfires and ensure reliability of service.126 Communities that
implement conversions pursuant to Rule 20D “receive 100% of utility
funding.”127

118. CPUC Undergrounding Programs: Conversion of Overhead Electric Lines to Underground Facilities
and Construction of New Underground Electric Lines, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
General.aspx?id=4403 (last visited June 28, 2020).
119. See infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text.
120. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, OVERHEAD TO UNDERGROUND CONVERSION PROGRAMS 8, 10–11 (on
file with Hastings Law Journal).
125. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Elec. Rule 20 & Related Matters, Cal.P.U.C.,
No. R. 17-05-010, 2017 WL 2269097, at *10 (May 11, 2017).
126. Id.
127. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
General.aspx?id=6442465120 (last visited June 28, 2020).
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Rule 20 should facilitate the annual undergrounding of a reasonable portion
of a utility’s network, but it does not. The CPUC estimates that the current Rule
20A program costs ratepayers $1 per month with an average of $95 million of
credits allocated annually to over 500 jurisdictions statewide.128 Yet, a 2016
CPUC review of the program found that SDG&E was the only energy company
that sufficiently utilized the program.129 SDG&E converts roughly fifteen miles
of overhead lines per year and aims to relocate San Diego’s remaining 1000
overhead utility lines within the next fifty-four years.130 San Diego’s
undergrounding initiative is paid for with funds from the state’s Rule 20A
program and a surcharge applied to San Diego residents’ utility bills, which
generates $60 million annually and has facilitated San Diego’s acceleration of
undergrounding.131 Furthermore, Rule 20 does not promote undergrounding in
rural and suburban areas, which are predominantly the high fire-threat zones.
Instead, the report shows that from 2011 to 2015 the majority of credits were
allocated to the Bay Area, Los Angeles, Ventura, Orange County, and San
Diego, which are predominantly urban counties.132 Significantly fewer credits
were issued to the Central Coast, Central Valley, Desert, Inland Empire, North
State, or Sierra Foothills.133 For instance, of the roughly $106.6 million of annual
allocations that were made in 2015, less than $20 million went to municipalities
in these high fire-threat regions.134 Moreover, between 2005–2017, nearly $760

128. MARTIN KURTOVICH & MARZIA ZAFAR, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, PROGRAM REVIEW: CALIFORNIA
OVERHEAD CONVERSION PROGRAM RULE 20A, at iv (2016), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/
CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work_Product
s_(2014_forward)(1)/PPD_Rule_20-A.pdf; CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 124, at 9.
129. KURTOVICH & ZAFAR, supra note 128, at v.
130. Utilities Undergrounding Program, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.gov/undergrounding/
overview (last visited June 28, 2020).
131. Id.; David Garrick, San Diego Will Double the Pace of Utility Undergrounding Work as Size of Task
Grows, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Feb. 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/
politics/sd-me-utility-underground-20180218-story.html.
132. KURTOVICH & ZAFAR, supra note 128, at 7 fig.8; see also Undergrounding Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 127.
133. KURTOVICH & ZAFAR, supra note 128, at 7 fig.8.
134. Id. at 6. According to the comments from California counties on instituting Rule 20, the current system
of credit allocation:
[I]t takes local governments years, if not decades or centuries, to accumulate enough credits to
underground a single mile of overhead powerlines, whether they bank the credits first or perform the
work and pay off the deficit afterward. For example, as of late 2016, the County of Napa had a
roughly $12 million undergrounding deficit for projects performed in St. Helena; with Napa’s
$155,792 per year credit allocation, it will be 77 years before the debt is retired. The city of Fort
Bragg in Mendocino County will need approximately 27 years, at an annual allocation of $36,697,
to accumulate $1 million, which is the median cost of undergrounding a single mile of overhead
power lines in a rural area. Point Arena, which receives $2,950 per year in allocations, will need 339
years to bank $1 million in credits. The cities of Cloverdale and Cotati in Sonoma County, which
receive between $20,000 and $25,000 per year in credits, will have to wait 40 to 50 years to
accumulate $1 million, and between 55 and 68 years to reach the roughly $1.367 million median for
suburban undergrounding.
Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, supra note 116, at 2–3.
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million went to San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland,
San Jose, Chula Vista, Fresno and San Bernardino County.135
Acknowledging the program’s failures, the CPUC issued a rulemaking for
revisions to the Rule 20A program in May 2017.136 The rulemaking is ongoing
and is assessing whether the criteria for public interest should be adjusted, how
joint utility and telecommunications infrastructure poles can be migrated
underground, and how to distribute credits and financing of undergrounding
projects fairly across localities.137 Changes to Rule 20 are critical to promote
modern public interest projects, but Rule 20 cannot alone solve the complexities
of building a resilient power grid as it has not ensured timely completion of
undergrounding projects on a schedule that comports with California’s climate
change laws; nor does it facilitate the prioritization of undergrounding by
utilities outside the Rule 20 program.
D. INVESTIGATING THE COSTS OF UNDERGROUNDING
While considerable, the actual cost of undergrounding may not be as high
as PG&E’s estimates imply.138 For example, EEI reports that although utilities
quote the cost of undergrounding each circuit mile to be in the millions, actual
costs are dependent on a number of factors, including location and whether the
installation is a new install or a migration of existing equipment.139 The EEI
found that the average cost per mile for converting overhead to underground
distribution ranged from $158,100 to $1.96 million in rural areas, $313,600 to
$2.42 million in suburban regions, and $1 million to $5 million in urban areas.140
Moreover, many utilities include the cost of installing new underground
facilities in existing rates,141 and IOU capital projects often include a 25%
overhead adder.142 Therefore, publicly available data on the costs of
undergrounding are likely not precise.
A recent independent audit investigating PG&E’s undergrounding
program found that much of PG&E’s undergrounding costs were above industry
standards.143 These costs were due to delayed project costs and inflated cost
estimates approved in PG&E’s general rate cases.144 PG&E’s average cost for
135. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
136. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Elec. Rule 20 and Related Matters, supra note
125, at *2.
137. Id. at *11–14; see also ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S SCOPING MEMO AND RULING, CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N 4–8 (2018), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M239/K744/239744695.PDF.
138. In June 2020, the CPUC updated its website and public information on undergrounding. The site
includes revised undergrounding costs for PG&E in 2019 dollars. PG&E now estimates undergrounding projects
to cost between $3.4 million and $6.1 million per mile, which substantially exceeds the costs revealed in the
audit of PG&E’s undergrounding program. Compare CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118, with
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 115, at 22–24.
139. HALL, supra note 15, at 31.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, supra note 116, at 7.
143. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
144. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 115, at 20.
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migrating distribution lines from overhead to underground between 2007 and
2016 was approximately $3.5 million for urban lines, $4.8 million for suburban
lines and $2.5 million for rural lines.145 While the urban costs were within EEI’s
maximum range, PG&E’s suburban and rural costs were 189% and 123% of the
EEI category maximums, respectively.146 PG&E rationalized its upward costs
because of increased population densities in suburban and rural regions.147
However, the audit found much of the bloated costs stemmed from delays caused
by poor project management. Shockingly, PG&E failed to track costs related to
inactive projects that accrued material, labor, and overhead costs, rendering it
impossible to separate real project costs from project delay costs.148
Therefore, there is limited data on the actual costs of undergrounding
PG&E’s network. Much of the roughly 20% of PG&E’s 106,681 circuit miles
distribution network that is already underground149 was paid for by
developers.150 Thus, the $243 billion undergrounding cost estimated above151
does not reflect the potential savings resulting from developers undergrounding
when rebuilding in areas destroyed by wildfires or migrating infrastructure when
developing in existing communities.152 It also does not reflect that not all of the
network can or should be migrated underground because of vulnerabilities due
to flooding and earthquakes.153 Additionally, the simple dollar cost estimate
does not factor in the reductions that may be possible by distributing costs
among telecommunications and internet providers that piggyback on PG&E’s
existing infrastructure. Nor does it take into account that some of the costs of
undergrounding will be offset by PG&E’s rate of return on capital investments,
which hovers steadily around 8%.154
Intriguingly, PG&E and the state have resources to put towards the costs
of undergrounding. For example, a portion of PG&E’s revenues could be put
towards undergrounding, increasing the fixed assets of the company upon which
stockholders would earn a rate of return. Even amidst the chaos of wildfires,
PG&E’s 2018 electrical operating revenues were $12.7 billion, and the company
generated “approximately $16.8 billion in total revenue.”155 Alternatively,

145. Id. at 22.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 23–24.
148. Id. at 20.
149. Id. at 7.
150. Baker, supra note 114.
151. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
152. See Facts About Undergrounding Electric Lines, supra note 12 (“In the counties of Butte, Calavaras,
Lake, Mendocino, Napa, Sonoma and Yuba affected by the October 2017 North Bay Fires, 118 miles of the 650
distribution miles are underground. Of the 118 miles, 80 of these underground miles are located in the Santa
Rosa area. Most of these underground lines were installed as part of new residential and commercial subdivision
developments.”).
153. Id.; Morris, supra note 110.
154. See Rate of Return (ROR) (Actual and Authorized), CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.
gov/General.aspx?id=12093 (last visited June 28, 2020); What is Cost of Capital (CoC)?, CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=10457 (last visited June 28, 2020).
155. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 115, at 7.
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PG&E could sell property in its real estate portfolio;156 or after emerging from
bankruptcy, PG&E could issue bonds for financing infrastructure projects. On
the other hand, if the state wanted to capitalize on a jobs program, it could
provide advances to PG&E or local municipalities from revenue bonds or the
state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund to contract undergrounding projects
with third parties.157 Additionally, municipalities could redeem the $1 billion in
currently unused Rule 20A allocations.158 Finally, federal programs such as the
Federal Communications Commission’s Broadband Deployment Advisory
Committee’s Dig Once initiative, which advocates for coordinated installation
of fiber-optic cable, phone lines and power lines,159 offer options for distributing
costs. Ultimately, determining how to cover the upfront costs of undergrounding
is a task for the Governor’s commission of experts, drawing on their expertise
in economics, accounting, and investment banking as well as environmental,
energy, land use, local government, social justice, and state regulatory laws.
E.

AN AVERSION TO UNDERGROUNDING

Despite Californians’ interest in undergrounding for safety, reliability,
aesthetic, and property value reasons,160 the CPUC and PG&E exhibit an
aversion for undergrounding. For example, PG&E routinely failed to prioritize
undergrounding and to spend funds to implement Rule 20 projects. Illustrating
this failure, the company has only depleted its undergrounding budget three
times since 2000—the last of which occurred in 2006.161 Although PG&E has
invested “more than $300 million” to underground overhead lines since 2012,162
the company has failed to spend $150 million in budgeted funds for
undergrounding since 2000 and instead has reprioritized the funds for
undisclosed projects.163 Alarmingly, the audit of PG&E’s Rule 20 program

156. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO. & PAC. GAS & ELEC. CORP., 2017 JOINT ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS
44 (2017), http://www.pgecorp.com/investors/financial_reports/annual_report_proxy_statement/ar_pdf/2017/
2017_Annual_Report.pdf; Spencer Silva, PG&E Owns Land Across California. What Will Happen to It?, S.F.
CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/travel/article/PG-E-owns-land-across-California-What-will-14028654.php
(last updated June 24, 2019). The sale of properties in PG&E’s real estate portfolio could also be used to repay
the $150 million in reprioritized Rule 20A funds. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
157. See Background, CAL. CLIMATE INVESTMENTS, http://www.caclimateinvestments.ca.gov/about-cci
(last visited June 28, 2020) (“Proceeds from the Cap-and-Trade Program facilitate comprehensive and
coordinated investments throughout California that further the State’s climate goals. These investments support
programs and projects that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the State and also deliver major economic,
environmental, and public health benefits for Californians, including meaningful benefits to the most
disadvantaged communities.”).
158. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Elec. Rule 20 and Related Matters, supra note
125, at *11; CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 115, at 11.
159. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Open Forum: Cost of Undergrounding Power Lines Is No Excuse for PG&E, S.F.
CHRON. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Open-Forum-Cost-of-under
grounding-power-lines-is-13658984.php.
160. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, supra note 116, at 9; see infra notes 206–07 and
accompanying text.
161. Baker, supra note 114.
162. Facts About Undergrounding Electric Lines, supra note 12.
163. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 115, at 44.
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characterized this reprioritization, coupled with the company’s lack of reporting
documentation, as indicative of fraud risk factors.164 Municipalities eager to
proceed with undergrounding projects, therefore, find themselves up against this
culture of disinterest, which leads to long project timelines and ballooning
costs.165
Further evidence of an aversion is that, in June 2020, the CPUC updated
its public information on undergrounding emphasizing that it is “10 times more
expensive than installing new distribution overhead lines” and “8 times more
expensive than insulating (covering) the conductors (wires) to prevent them
from igniting when contacting vegetation and other foreign objects.”166 The
CPUC cites Southern California Edison’s (SCE) “assert[ion] that installing
covered conductors and metal poles has a mitigation benefit-to-cost ratio that is
significantly higher than . . . undergrounding . . . .”167 According to SCE, “full
deployment of covered conductors and metal poles in [high fire-threat districts]
are estimated to mitigate approximately 60 percent of fires associated with
SCE’s electrical distribution facilities in [high fire-threat districts].”168 In
contrast, “[u]ndergrounding theoretically would mitigate 100 percent of such
fires, all else equal.”169 Therefore, even if covered conductors and metal poles
were fully deployed, 40% of the current fire risk would remain. Significantly,
the CPUC does not provide information about how SCE calculated the
mitigation effectiveness-to-cost ratio.
In addition, the CPUC does not verify IOU undergrounding costs.170
Rather, to determine whether “IOUs provide ‘reasonable’ cost estimates for the
various components of individual undergrounding projects,” the CPUC
encourages municipalities to internally audit or utilize a third party to verify.171
Moreover, the $3.8 million average cost per mile for undergrounding now
provided by the CPUC is derived from the average of the low and high cost
estimates provided by the IOUs.172 Importantly, the high end of the IOU ranges
likely reflects the cost of undergrounding in a fully developed, urban
environment like San Francisco or Los Angeles, which requires navigating and
replacing as necessary existing underground infrastructure and strict permitting
requirements. PG&E’s 2019 estimates range from $3.4 million to $6.1
million.173 These estimates vary significantly from PG&E’s prior disclosures,174
as well as SDG&E’s 2019 cost range of $2.64 million to $3.696 million per

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 39.
Baker, supra note 114.
CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118.
Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118.
See Facts About Undergrounding Electric Lines, supra note 12.
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mile,175 and SCE’s $3 million estimate used in its mitigation effectiveness-tocost ratio.176
The deviation in cost estimates indicates that an independent body of
experts is required to review utilities’ material, design, labor, regulatory
compliance and permitting costs to determine a standardized assessment for
reasonable costs, applying a holistic cost benefit analysis rather than a
conventional and atomistic cost benefit analysis to determine the mitigation
effectiveness-to-cost ratio. This is because many cities and counties see
undergrounding as a practical, long-term solution to safeguard the public interest
and require a defensible estimate of reasonable costs for undergrounding
projects.177 Supporting this view and the viability of undergrounding, 73,500
miles of distribution lines have been placed underground since the 1960s.178
Thus, the cost of undergrounding cannot actually be cost prohibitive at all times.
Therefore, it is time for an independent assessment of costs to be provided to the
public, municipalities, CPUC, and policy makers so that the debate over
undergrounding is not dictated by opaque and unexamined cost estimates
provided by the industry.
III. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO THE MEGAFIRES
A. SENATE BILL NO. 901 (2017–2018)
In response to the devastating loss of life and property, the rising costs of
recovery and rebuilding, the outsized impact of megafires on the utilities’ ability
to provide service, and the immense dangers of carbon emissions into the
atmosphere and impacts on air quality, California lawmakers have taken steps
to address the effects of climate change and megafires. In the fall of 2018,
California’s legislature passed Senate Bill No. 901 (S.B. 901), the most
sweeping wildfire prevention bill passed in decades.179 At the time, Governor
Brown called S.B. 901 “absolutely necessary.”180 Introduced and authored by
California Senator Bill Dodd, a representative of Napa, S.B. 901 aims to:
improve forest health to reduce the risk of wildfires and greenhouse gases;
enhance ecosystem function; improve wildlife habitats and water quality;
increase water supply and carbon sequestration; and, importantly, reduce the
cost to the state for rebuilding from and responding to wildfires.181 The act
recognizes that, in order to reduce the risk and frequency of catastrophic fires,
all stakeholders must take drastic steps to achieve that goal. Significantly, the

175. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118.
176. Id.
177. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, supra note 116, at 9.
178. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118.
179. John Myers, As Climate Changes Worsens Wildfires, California Will Spend $1 Billion and Give
Utilities New Ways to Shrink Their Fire Expenses, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-pol-ca-wildfire-prevention-law-signed-20180921-story.html.
180. Id.
181. S.B. 901 § 1(g), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
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act requires agencies and departments across state government to take action
within a short timeframe to update guidance documents, implement mitigation
plans, and train personnel, all with the state’s climate change goals in mind.
In addition to the law’s direct goals to protect California’s landscape and
achieve the state’s goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, S.B. 901 also
targets the practices of public utilities. For instance, the law governs utility
contracting for private fire safety services,182 and includes measures for
catastrophic wildfire ratepayer protection financing.183 While the law’s
measures are critical of the utilities’ practices, the act declares that “California’s
electric and gas utilities provide essential services to California residents and
businesses, which are necessary to maintaining the vitality of California’s
economy.”184 The legislature underscored that “[s]afe and reliable electric and
gas utility service is vital to public health, public safety, air quality, and reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases.”185 To ensure reliable service, S.B. 901
mandates utilities “construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and
equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed
by those electrical lines and equipment.”186
Each utility must submit a WMP for review by CPUC and CAL FIRE and
that plan must then be formally approved by CPUC.187 The law provides, in part,
that WMPs shall include: a description of responsible persons; objectives for the
WMP, including prevention strategies and programs the utility will adopt “to
minimize the risk of its electrical lines and equipment causing catastrophic
wildfires, including consideration of dynamic climate change risks;”188
protocols for de-energizing the utility’s network that consider public safety
impacts;189 details of the utility’s vegetation management program;190 “plans for
inspections of the [utility’s] electrical infrastructure;”191 identification of all
risks for wildfires within the utility’s service territory;192 and plans describing
how the utility will restore service following a wildfire.193
Importantly, the law calls for details regarding the “[r]isks and risk drivers
associated with design, construction, operations, and maintenance of the
electrical corporation’s equipment and facilities”194 and the measures utilities
will take to protect their systems and “achieve the highest level of safety,
reliability, and resiliency.”195 Utilities are to ensure that their systems are
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. § 31 (adding CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 764).
Id. § 32 (adding CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE, art. 5.8).
Id. § 34(a)(1) (adding CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 854.2).
Id. § 34(a)(2).
Id. § 38(a) (amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8386).
Id. § 38(b).
Id. § 38(c)(1)–(3).
Id. § 38(c)(6).
Id. § 38(c)(8).
Id. § 38(c)(9).
Id. § 38(c)(10).
Id. § 38(c)(16)(A).
Id. § 38(c)(10)(A).
Id. § 38(c)(12).
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“prepared for a major event, including hardening and modernizing its
infrastructure with improved engineering, system design, standards, equipment,
and facilities, such as undergrounding, insulation of distribution wires, and pole
replacement.”196 Importantly, utilities must demonstrate that they are adequately
staffed to accomplish the requirements of Public Utilities Code section 8386 and
their approved WMPs. S.B. 901’s requirements emphasize the state’s concern
with the utilities’ ability to manage their networks in a manner that will
significantly reduce the risk of catastrophic fire and prevent loss of property and
life.
As a follow up to S.B. 901, the legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1054
(A.B. 1054) in the summer of 2019. The law reaffirms that “the state’s electrical
corporations must invest in hardening of the state’s electrical infrastructure and
vegetation management to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire.”197 The law
provides many measures aimed at accomplishing this goal, including creation of
a wildfire insurance fund intended to “support[] the credit worthiness of
electrical corporations, and provide[] a mechanism to attract capital for
investment in safe, clean, and reliable power for California at a reasonable cost
to ratepayers.”198 In addition, A.B. 1054 established the WSD and the WASB to
oversee development and implementation of WMPs.199 The WSD approves and
audits the utilities’ WMPs.200 The WASB is comprised of seven members
selected from “industry experts, academics, and persons with labor and
workforce safety experience”201 that are to meet “no less often than quarterly”
to provide guidance to the WSD regarding the contents of WMPs.202
B. PG&E’S PLAN WILL NOT REDUCE CATASTROPHIC FIRES
In its 2019 WMP, PG&E acknowledged that, because of the size and
volume of its overhead power lines, the company faces high-risk and immense
challenges.203 PG&E’s system includes the majority of California’s high-density
forest area and has more distribution lines in high risk fire zones than any other
utility in the state.204 Fifty-two percent of PG&E’s 70,000-square-mile service
area is classified as “extreme (Tier 3) or elevated (Tier 2) fire-threat areas.”205
To mitigate the fire threat, PG&E’s 2019 WMP utilized “a risk-based approach,
meaning highest risk areas [would] be addressed first.”206 It outlined how PG&E
planned to attack the growing wildfire threat by: enacting enhanced vegetation
196. Id.
197. A.B. 1054 § 2(b), 2019–2020 Leg. (Cal. 2019).
198. Id. § 1(a)(5).
199. Id. § 2(e).
200. Wildfire Safety Division, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/wsd/ (last visited June
28, 2020).
201. A.B. 1054 § 4(b) (adding CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 326.1).
202. Id. § 4(c); id. § 5(c) (adding CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 326.2)
203. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 18.
204. Id. at 19.
205. Id. at 7.
206. Id.
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management measures, which included removal of trees that have a high
potential to fall, as well as removal of vegetation near power lines;207 expanding
inspections; developing system hardening measures that include “replacing bare
overhead conductor with covered conductor, select undergrounding” and
upgrading equipment with low fire risk equipment and more resilient poles;208
increasing situational awareness, meaning knowledge of environmental and
weather conditions; enhancing controls to allow for remote reclosing; and
expanding PG&E’s Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program.209 A CPUC
guidance decision on this WMP stressed that current prevention measures do not
adequately address ways to stop utility-caused wildfires and that the CPUC
understands the need to increase efforts to reduce the risk of megafires.210
A challenge to the feasibility of PG&E’s WMP is that the WMP objectives
rely on the participation of third-party actors. For example, PG&E cautioned that
all of its WMP objectives are contingent on cooperation by, but not limited to,
property owners and environmental permitting agencies.211 Additionally,
included in both the overview of PG&E’s system hardening program and
vegetation management program were caveats that the estimated work and costs
are related to the company’s ability to adequately staff the proposed programs.
For instance, PG&E estimates that it will take nearly ten years to implement its
system hardening program, which aims to upgrade 7100 circuit miles in areas of
high fire risk by rebuilding the overhead distribution system, replacing assets
that have aged past their useful date, and clearing vegetation near the system,212
because of “constraints on available qualified personnel and materials.”213
Further illustrating the fact that PG&E’s WMP is not sufficient to
adequately reduce fire risk, PG&E submitted a second amendment to the
company’s WMP on April 25, 2019214 that highlights the challenges the
company faced in meeting its “ambitious goals.”215 In particular, the company
underscored that its new Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP) criteria
were much stricter than historical criteria and, accordingly, the company
identified “greater numbers of necessary actions, which require additional
resources.”216 Some of the amendments to PG&E’s WMP included: extensions
of time to accomplish targets set by the WSIP program due to inclement weather
as well as enhancements to programs that require obtaining additional land
rights; an increased focus on de-energization; and a caveat that the company will
207. Id. at 5.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 5–6.
210. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Elec. Util. Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate
Bill 901 (2018), Cal.P.U.C., No. D. 19-05-036, 2019 WL 2474155, at *1–3, *6 (May 30, 2019).
211. Id. at 55.
212. Id. at 63.
213. Id.
214. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., SECOND AMENDMENT TO PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S (U 39 E)
WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN (2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M283/K824/
283824582.PDF.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Id.
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assess 100 million trees, but will only document those trees needing work.217
Significantly, the company altered its timelines by replacing specific completion
dates with open ended language.218 These amendments underscore the
impracticalities of PG&E’s WMP.
PG&E’s second amended filing coincided with comments made by
California municipalities to the CPUC responding to the utilities’ WMPs.219 The
cities requested that utilities work with them to make mitigation plans as the
municipalities were particularly concerned with the utilities’ emphasis on deenergizing. For example, the City of Moorpark underscored that de-energizing
a distribution system would shift the burden to local government workers to
perform activities typically done through electronic means, like directing traffic
when traffic signals shut down.220 The City of Placerville echoed the sentiment
of stressing the importance of proper communication between local
governments and utilities. In particular, Placerville asked utilities to address the
impact on cities not in a wildfire threat zone that must still endure the related
outages from de-energization associated with a high-risk zone.221 In addition to
calls for the utilities to work with localities and provide clarification on deenergization, a number of cities and counties emphasized the need for increased
undergrounding.222
In approving PG&E’s 2020 WMP, the WSD acknowledged the concerns
of the municipalities and included significant conditions for approval.223 For
example, WSD found that the plan’s proposed expenditure of $9.54 billion
between 2020 and 2022 will fail to adequately reduce the risk of fire without
substantially improved vegetation management, grid hardening, risk analysis
and resource allocation, and PSPS measures.224 In particular, PG&E’s
“vegetation management work indicates there may be a problem with the quality
of the work, as reflected by low pass rates of quality assurance checks . . . .”225
Additionally, the plan fails to account for “external costs to the community
217. Id. at 6–7.
218. Id. at 12.
219. See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Elec. Rule 20 and Related Matters, supra
note 125.
220. Letter from Troy Brown, City Manager, City of Moorpark, to Michael Picker, President, Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n (Dec. 11, 2018), http://cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/News
Updates/2018/City%20of%20Moorpark%20Letter.pdf.
221. City of Placerville, Comments on the Proposed Decision on Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s
Wildfire Mitigation Plan 5 (Oct. 25, 2018), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M292/K932/
292932597.PDF.
222. See, e.g., City of Laguna Beach, Comments on Rulemaking 18-10-007, at 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M238/K011/238011237.PDF; City of Malibu, Comments
on Wildfire Mitigation Plans 5 (Oct. 25, 2018), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/
K180/273180160.PDF: County of Santa Clara, Comments on the Proposed Wildfire Mitigation Plan Templates
and Other Evaluative Materials 5 (Jan. 7, 2020), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M323/
K764/323764313.PDF.
223. Letter from Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n to Stakeholders, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 1, 4 (May 7, 2020),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M336/K461/336461920.PDF.
224. Id. at 4, 12–13.
225. Id. at 12.
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impacted by power shutoffs and assumes 100 percent wildfire mitigation where
power is shut off.” 226 It also relies on the marketing phrase “smarter, smaller,
and shorter” rather than detailed data to show how it intends to reduce the
“number of customers affected by PSPS events by 30 percent.” 227 Significantly,
WSD found that “the plan lacks significant details for the WSD to be fully
convinced that PG&E will be able to execute on its plan fully and on time.”228
Thus, as evidenced by PG&E’s WMPs, PG&E’s preferred mitigation
measures are impractical for both PG&E and municipalities; meanwhile,
undergrounding is still not a priority method at PG&E for mitigating the risk of
wildfire. In its decision on PG&E’s 2019 WMP, the CPUC found that PG&E
intended to use undergrounding for system resiliency in “rare cases.”229 Mr.
Johnson’s December 2019 congressional testimony further confirms PG&E’s
disinterest in undergrounding as it is only mentioned once in relation to system
hardening projects and was not included in his action plan summary.230
Moreover, PG&E’s Test Year 2020 General Rate Case states that
“undergrounding is not a prominent feature of that funding request because of
its higher cost to benefit ratio.”231 Additionally, PG&E’s 2020 WMP “does not
separately report undergrounding from its overall $5.1 billion system hardening
planned spend, making it impossible to determine how much PG&E spends on
undergrounding and difficult to assess the various initiatives within this
program.”232 This, despite S.B. 901’s requirement that each utility pursue
undergrounding “to ensure its system will achieve the highest level of safety,
reliability, and resiliency . . . .”233
C. THE REALITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PG&E’S WMP
PG&E’s WMPs will not ensure system resiliency nor do they adequately
account for the full costs of PG&E’s preferred wildfire mitigation strategies. For
instance, while vegetation management is a top priority, its vegetation
management plan is unsustainable. Achievement of its goal, set in 2019, of a
235% increase in vegetation management, requires maintaining a workforce of
3000 qualified tree workers.234 To determine if that is even feasible, PG&E
reviewed data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the entire “Tree Trimmers
and Pruners” occupation, which showed national employment of roughly 41,000
individuals with fewer than 6000 based in California.235 Furthermore, few of
these tree trimmers are qualified to be line clearance certified, which is required
226. Id. at 13.
227. Id. at 53.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Elec. Util. Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate
Bill 901 (2018), 351 P.U.R. 4th 406 (May 30, 2019).
230. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3.
231. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
232. Letter from Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n to Stakeholders, supra note 225, at 17.
233. S.B. 901 § 38(c)(12), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
234. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 82.
235. Id. at 82–83.
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for working next to power lines.236 Qualified personnel must also be able to scale
the incredible heights of trees in PG&E’s service area, which further limits the
pool of those who can be line clearance certified,237 making maintenance of a
3000 tree trimmer workforce problematic. Moreover, the costs of vegetation
management will only continue to rise as vegetation management requires
annual maintenance, because—as we all know well—trees grow back.238
Therefore, this annual expenditure will continue to increase as the company
clears more miles of overhangs, driving the overall long-term cost of the
company’s vegetation management program upward.239
Adding to this unsustainability is the scope of the vegetation management
strategy. PG&E estimates that it will take until 2026 to address the 100 million
dead trees in PG&E’s service territory.240 Furthermore, even proper vegetation
management can start wildfires as it did in the Butte Fire that erupted due to a
downed tree which was weakened by previous PG&E vegetation
management.241 In response to this reality, Santa Cruz, in its motion for party
status for the Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Electric Utility
Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate Bill 901, requested that utilities
invest in “measures that will have proven benefits” such as undergrounding.242
The city cited that “Southern California Edison has already concluded,
preventing contact with vegetation is difficult if not impossible.”243 Therefore,
rather than rely on vegetation management, the city emphasized that “[t]he safest
course is to design a system that can withstand contact.”244 Mr. Johnson
reaffirmed this reality in his congressional testimony stating, “[t]o manage
vegetation risks along our rights-of-way alone, PG&E has spent approximately
$3.8 billion since 2009.”245 Although PG&E has met “state and federal
vegetation and fire safety standards through routine vegetation management
work,”246 the program has not prevented ignitions from vegetation.
The challenges of accomplishing PG&E’s preferred mitigation strategies
were also underscored in PG&E’s updated progress report for its 2019 WMP
filed in compliance with Administrative Law Judge Sarah Thomas’ December

236. Id. at 83; see also Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3 (“[I]n 2019 PG&E hired more than 2,000
additional contractors, most of whom are qualified IBEW represented members, and employees to conduct this
important vegetation work.”).
237. Lauren Hepler, As California Wildfire Looms, Finding Tree Trimmers Is a New Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/business/energy-environment/pge-wildfire-trees.html.
238. Letter from Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n to Stakeholders, supra note 238, at 45.
239. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 75.
240. Id. at 82.
241. Russell Gold et al., PG&E: Wired to Fail, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/pg-e-wired-to-fail-11577509261.
242. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, MOTION FOR PARTY STATUS OF COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ 4 (2018),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M251/K668/251668327.PDF.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3.
246. Id.
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2019 ruling.247 The report shows that PG&E failed to complete enhanced
vegetation management of 1000 circuit miles within the required timeframe.
Although the company completed its goal five months later, the quality of that
work scored 30% below the “92 percent ‘meets expectations’ performance”
target.248 Additionally, the report shows that vegetation management, system
hardening and the WSIP faced delays due to “a combination of factors, including
inclement weather; the availability of equipment, materials, and qualified
personnel; objections from property owners or governmental agencies; and
environmental permitting requirements.”249 This indicates that PG&E’s
concerns raised in its 2019 WMP regarding the feasibility of completing its plans
have been realized.
Likewise, de-energization is an inadequate mitigation measure due to the
fact that PSPS events will quickly become politically untenable. De-energization
of a utility network can effectively reduce the risk of wildfire to a community.
Although it is the quickest and most cost-effective way for the company to
reduce the risk of wildfires, it is not the best long-term solution for
Californians.250 PG&E customers acutely experienced the consequences of
PG&E’s prioritization of de-energization in the fall of 2019. In particular, the
chaos and confusion surrounding the de-energizing of the Caldecott Tunnel,
which straddles Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and is a critical transit
artery for the Bay Area, consummately illustrated the unintended consequences
of simply shutting off the power.251 There, PG&E failed to inform California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) that both counties might lose power,
something Caltrans had never prepared for and thus did not have the necessary
back-up generators in place to ensure continuation of service. This failure to
communicate left thousands of commuters uncertain of whether they would be
stranded going to or from work.252 In addition to commute disruptions, the PSPS
events disproportionately impacted low-income Californians and other
vulnerable populations that depend on reliable service for basic, everyday
necessities such as lighting, air conditioning, and refrigeration.253

247. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., UPDATED PROGRESS REPORT OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (U 39
E) WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN (2020), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/
News_Room/NewsUpdates/2020/R1810007%20PGE%20WMP%20Status%20Update%201-15-20.pdf.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id. at 3.
250. Underscoring this point, WSD guidelines for effective, world class WMPs now require that “[t]he result
should be that with each passing year California is safer from wildfire threats, with a significant reduction and
eventual elimination of the need to use Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) as a mitigation action.” Letter from
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n to Stakeholders, supra note 238, at 3.
251. Annie Sciacca et al., CalTrans, PG&E Court Commuters’ Anger with Confusion Over Major Tunnels,
MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/08/caldecott-tom-lantos-tunnels-to-close-amid-poweroutage/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2019).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Jackie Botts, “We Need the Food that We Lost.” Low-Income Families Still Reeling from
Blackouts, CALMATTERS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://calmatters.org/projects/california-psps-power-shutoffspoverty-spoiled-food-hunger/; DEP’T OF EMERGENCY MGMT., SONOMA CTY., TESTIMONY ON THE IMPACT OF
THE SONOMA COUNTY PG&E POWER SHUTOFFS ON MEDICALLY FRAGILE OLDER ADULTS AND RESIDENTS WITH
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Following a poorly executed PSPS that left nearly 740,000 Californians
across thirty-five counties without power for many days, Governor Newsom
demanded that the CPUC open an investigation into PG&E’s de-energization
practices and hold the utility accountable for the disruption caused.254 Governor
Newsom underscored that “[t]his lack of preparation and poor performance is
particularly alarming given that, prior to the event, PG&E responded to the
scrutiny and questioning of multiple state and local agencies by asserting that it
could handle a PSPS event without the need for additional assistance.”255 In
addition to the impact the poor execution had on Californians, the full costs of
the PSPS event are not yet known. However, Michael Wara, Director of Stanford
University’s Climate and Energy Policy Program, estimated that “[a] PSPS for
a representative 600 [thousand] accounts that lasted just [twenty-four hours]
would cause $1.8 billion in costs.”256 If PSPSs are to be used regularly for
multiple days at a time, over multiple years, the costs will add up quickly.
Analysis of PG&E’s WMP and corporate attitude therefore illustrate that their
preferred measures to reduce wildfire risk, vegetation management and deenergization, are inadequate to safeguard public health, welfare, and the
environment.
Yet even if system hardening, vegetation management, and PSPS events
were to accomplish the goals of S.B. 901, the new abnormal demonstrates that
overhead power lines are an outdated technology. PG&E’s PSPS, issued on
October 25, 2019, evidenced this issue, as the company cut power to an expected
850,000 accounts in response to predictions of historic winds ranging from fortyfive to seventy miles per hour.257 The company warned that “[w]inds of this
magnitude pose a higher risk of damage and sparks on the electric system and
rapid wildfire spread.”258 As Mr. Johnson stated in his congressional testimony,
“[l]ike any home, building or other infrastructure, electric transmission and
distribution lines and related infrastructure are vulnerable to . . . winds over 70
miles per hour.”259 A report published by Nature Climate Change provides
evidence that this increase in high wind speeds will continue for at least a

DISABILITIES, https://www.chhs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/cpuc-AA-PSPS-impact-11-15-v2.pdf (last
visited June 28, 2020).
254. Letter from Gavin Newsom, Governor of Cal., to Marybel Batjer, President, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/10.14.19-CPUC-Letter.pdf.
255. Id.
256. Michael Wara (@MichaelWWara), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:35 AM), https://twitter.com/Michael
WWara/status/1181473102414221312.
257. Press Release, PG&E, Forecasts Indicate Potential for Historic Wind Event This Weekend;
Approximately 850,000 Customers Notified that They May Be Impacted Beginning Saturday Evening (Oct. 25,
2019), https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20191025_forecasts_indicate_
potential_for_historic_wind_event_this_weekend_approximately_850000_customers_notified_that_they_may
_be_impacted_beginning_saturday_evening.
258. Id.
259. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 1.
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decade.260 Commenting for an investigative report by the Wall Street Journal
into PG&E’s safety culture and track record, retired CPUC Administrative Law
Judge Janice Grau emphasized that both the CPUC and PG&E were unprepared
for the change in winds and particularly the risks posed by Diablo winds.261
Diablo winds pose high fire threats to the Bay Area and are characterized by San
Jose State’s Fire Weather Research Laboratory as “California’s Critical Fire
Weather Pattern.”262 Winds of such high speed and intensity dry vegetation and
threaten the overhead power line system.263
State legislators are recognizing the limitations of current mitigation
measures and the public’s desire for undergrounding. Assembly Bill No. 281
(A.B. 281), introduced by Assembly Member Jim Frazier of the 11th Assembly
district, which includes Solano County and parts of Sacramento County, is
winding its way through committee review.264 A.B. 281 would require utilities
to underground power lines in high fire-threat areas.265 Senate Bill No. 584,
introduced by Senator John Moorlach of the 37th Senate district, which includes
portions of Orange County, would obligate the CPUC to develop matching fund
programs to finance municipal undergrounding projects in Tier 3 districts.266
Senate Bill No. 70 (S.B. 70), enacted in October 2019, requires that utilities
include a description in their WMPs of “where and how the [utility] considered
undergrounding electrical distribution lines within those areas of its service
territory identified to have the highest wildfire risk.”267 S.B. 70 is a significant
step in the right direction, but likely does not go far enough to ensure
undergrounding is made a top priority at the utilities. At the time of writing, this
law is seven months old and the practical impacts are not yet measurable; they
will need to be studied in the context of the 2020 WMPs.
The new abnormal requires more than the replacement of the current
overhead distribution system to ensure Californians’ safety and accessibility to
reliable power because the current technology is not suited for the new
abnormal. Although this Note focuses on PG&E, the principles expressed should
apply to all California electrical utilities. Even if the state expands reliance on

260. See generally Zhenzong Zheng et al., A Reversal in Global Terrestrial Stilling and Its Implications for
Wind Energy Production, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 979, 984 (2019) (“[T]he increases in wind speeds should
continue for at least a decade because these oscillations change over decadal time frames.”).
261. Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, “Safety Is Not a Glamour Thing”: How PG&E Regulators Failed to
Stop Wildfire Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-caused-over-400fires-in-2018-where-were-the-regulators-11575834385.
262. Diablo Winds-California’s Critical Fire Weather Pattern, FIRE WEATHER RES. LAB., https://www.fire
weather.org/diablo-winds (last visited June 28, 2020).
263. Jason Samenow & Andrew Freedman, What’s Driving the Historic California High-Wind Events, and
Worsening the Wildfires, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/10/28/
whats-driving-historic-california-high-wind-events-worsening-wildfires/ (“The winds have the critical effect of
drying out the air as the air descends after passing over mountain peaks. When the ultradry air overlays parched
vegetation, tinderbox conditions develop that are ripe for extreme fire growth.”).
264. A.B. 281, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2019).
265. Id.
266. S.B. 584, 2018–2019 Leg. (Cal. 2019).
267. S.B. 70, 2019–2020 Leg. (Cal. 2019).
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microgrids268 and distributive generation technologies269 in support of its
greenhouse gas reduction goals, it will still need a reliable grid network.270 As
we invest in the electric technologies of the future, why rebuild our grid in a
century old model? As Mr. Weissman states, “we really only [use overhead
power lines] now because it’s cheap. . . . The fact that there are now these very
large liabilities for losses coming from failure of the lines, arguably that ought
to change the way we assess the cost of these things.” 271
CONCLUSION
If Governor Newsom is serious about ensuring that Californians have
“access to safe, reliable and affordable service . . . and that California continues
to make forward progress on our climate goals,”272 then PG&E’s distribution
network—of poorly maintained lines built nearly a century ago273—must be
remade. While the upfront costs are expensive, the benefits of undergrounding
greatly outweigh those costs by eliminating the sparks that ignite the megafires
of the new abnormal. Utilities would save the annual expense of costly
vegetation management, system hardening, drone and helicopter inspections,
and the liabilities associated with being responsible for megafires.274
Californians who may not have had direct connections to fire zones would no
longer experience smoke-filled skies for weeks on end and power outages for
days. Our state and its current economy, health care system, and greenhouse gas
reduction programs cannot withstand decades of the new abnormal. Providing
reliable electric service will require a regulatory system that approaches the
state’s energy needs from a preemptive rather than a reactive perspective. The
Governor’s commission of experts should provide the leadership for
determining when, where and how selective undergrounding will be done. Their
report should act as guidance for municipalities, utilities and the CPUC on how
to implement undergrounding expeditiously in California. For environmental
sustainability and public health reasons, a holistic cost benefit analysis shows
that it is no longer reasonable to write off burying wires as too expensive.
Selective undergrounding is cheaper and less costly to life and property than the
horror and devastation of megafires. The urgency of climate change demands
that the state take action to cause utilities to remediate obsolete technology, such

268. David Roberts & Alvin Chang, Meet the Microgrid, the Technology Poised to Transform Electricity,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/15/16714146/greener-more-reliable-moreresilient-grid-microgrids (last updated May 24, 2018).
269. Distributed Generation of Electricity and Its Environmental Impacts, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts (last visited June
28, 2020).
270. See 1 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2018 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 16–19 (2018), https://ww2.
energy.ca.gov/2018publications/CEC-100-2018-001/CEC-100-2018-001-V1_spreads.pdf.
271. Cathy Bussewitz, California Power Outages: Isn’t There an Easier Way?, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Oct. 10,
2019), https://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/10159681-181/california-power-outages-isnt-there?sba=AAS.
272. Press Release, supra note 64.
273. Gold et al., supra note 241.
274. See PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 1–3, attach. E.
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as overhead power lines, and to improve regulatory structures to ensure a
resilient power grid able to withstand the new abnormal.

